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Yesterday’s report by HM Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP) on Oakwood prison, run by G4S since April 2012,
has shown how difficult it is to put the performance and culture of new prisons onto a positive
footing. Simon Bastow writes about how the Oakwood case provides important lessons for
government on integrating existing experience into radical reform.
Usually when HMIP reports get picked up by the media, it is good to get some perspective by
reading the short Introduction, counting the words that are positive about the prison, then counting
the words that are negative, and seeing what the overall balance is. A recent report on Bronzefield
prison, for example, stirred up pointed criticism by media and prison reform charities on excessive
use of the segregation unit for female prisoners, but on balance the actual word count showed more positive
evaluation than negative (not that this nullifies the negative of course).
In the case of Yesterday’s Oakwood prison report, there is no such net positive balance. More than four in every five
words in the Introduction were plainly damning about performance of this privately managed training prison over its
first 18 months.
The problems at Oakwood are evident in the report. A combination of a super-charged rate of increase in the size of
the prison from scratch to 1600 in less than one year (see Figure 1 below), and an inexperienced and vulnerable
staff group put the prison in this precarious situation. Stress is heightened also by the fact that this is a Category C
training prison, and inmates tend to get more settled for longer periods of time (compared to local prisons), and
basically have more incentive to develop corrosive cultures and practices.
Figure 1: The rapid rate of increase in growth of Oakwood prison, from April 2012 to July 2013
One line of argument is that new prisons,
public or private, are by their very nature
difficult to open successfully. And reports from
Chief Inspectors over the years have
highlighted the dangers of judging new prisons
too early (see p3) without giving them time to
iron out problems. Most new prisons in the last
few decades have been opened by private
sector contractors, and so we should be
cautious about how far we interpret this
general problem as something particular to the
private sector way of doing things.
The key difference however in the private
sector is this staff experience issue. And what
makes these criticisms worrying is that they
echo the kinds of things that the Inspectorate
was saying a decade ago about new prisons in
the private sector.  In 2003, for example,
Ashfield and Dovegate prisons were both
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heavily criticized on staffing issues. The verdict on Dovegate, a Serco Cat C prison, was a ‘worrying lack of
experience and confidence amongst a young, locally recruited staff, few of whom had any previous prison
experience’ (p3).
As the market has matured (and it has), we would have expected that the private sector would have learnt how to
open prisons from scratch, how to recruit for them from a local workforce, how to train staff on the art of prison-craft,
and how to manage problems of high staff turnover.
In my own conversations with directors in recent years, signs are that the sector has learnt a great deal. G4S has
run what has been widely regarded as one of the best local prisons in the estate, Altcourse, and this and other
private prisons have shown the public sector how to grow experienced and well-balanced staff groups, with good
gender and ethnicity mix, and run perfectly good regimes. In a previous blog, I have also shown how private sector
local prisons have been consistently above-average performers on reducing reoffending since 2007.
Yet Oakwood has shown that there is a fine line between prisons that are high performing and those that fall into
deteriorating patterns. We have seen this in the public sector over the years, as prisons deemed ‘failing’ are turned
around in fairly short periods by ‘fixer’ governors coming in. And it is interesting that G4S responded to impending
signs of difficulty earlier in 2013 by bringing in the former director responsible for Altcourse’s success, John
McLaughlin, to turn around the fortunes of Oakwood. A sign of a maturing private market mirroring some well-
established ‘bossist’ syndromes of the public system.
Important also is the extent to which contractors are subject to scrutiny about the experience mix of new staff
groups, and how staff with proven prison experience are being integrated into new prisons to stabilize the early
years. It is not always easy for contractors to get access to a ready-made workforce, and for various logistical and
ideological reasons, it may be difficult to attract experienced officers from the public sector. So new private prisons
must work with what they have got in that sense. But there is clearly still a major risk here. Is there a role for HMIP
to report on the balance of staff experience, especially in new prisons? What percentage of staff in Oakwood, for
example, had no prior experience of working with prisoners? This is important information that should be made
public.
More broadly, there are important lessons for government’s radical plans to open up the provision of probation
services to the private and third sector. Radical reform may be fine in and of itself, but to do so without allowing
existing public sector probation trusts to submit applications to run services (either unilaterally or in collaboration
with private or third sector organizations) runs the risks of exactly the same type of large-scale experience-deficit
problems occurring. Government has announced funding to support mutual bids from public sector staff, but it not
clear what kind of impact this will have in competition with large and well-organized private/third sector offers.
So to expect these brand new and large-scale regional probation contracts to go from scratch to high impact is
naïve. But to do so while at the same time actively side-lining a vast wealth of actual existing probation experience
across a whole public sector system seems to risk the same kinds of problems down the line.
This was presumably the last thing that G4S needed at the moment as they respond to claims of alleged fraudulent
activity on contract payments, but reputation is too important to these large contractors, and it is likely that the next
HMIP inspection at Oakwood will find marked improvements in the regime and culture. There are longer term
lessons however at stake, relating to the way in which we do radical reform in our key public services. There is
nothing intrinsically wrong with radical thinking, but the fact that a large contract can still go so badly wrong in what
is effectively a mature market should serve as a timely reminder for government and its criminal justice reform
programme.
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Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British
Politics and Policy blog, nor of the London School of Economics. Please read
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